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Hongjie Yu18 and Angus Nicoll19Abstract
Background: School closure is a non-pharmaceutical intervention that was considered in many national pandemic
plans developed prior to the start of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, and received considerable attention
during the event. Here, we retrospectively review and compare national and local experiences with school closures
in several countries during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. Our intention is not to make a systematic review of
country experiences; rather, it is to present the diversity of school closure experiences and provide examples from
national and local perspectives.
Methods: Data were gathered during and following a meeting, organized by the European Centres for Disease
Control, on school closures held in October 2010 in Stockholm, Sweden. A standard data collection form was
developed and sent to all participants. The twelve participating countries and administrative regions (Bulgaria,
China, France, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Serbia, South Africa,
Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States) provided data.
Results: Our review highlights the very diverse national and local experiences on school closures during the A
(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. The processes including who was in charge of making recommendations and who was in
charge of making the decision to close, the school-based control strategies, the extent of school closures, the public
health tradition of responses and expectations on school closure varied greatly between countries. Our review also
discusses the many challenges associated with the implementation of this intervention and makes recommendations
for further practical work in this area.
Conclusions: The single most important factor to explain differences observed between countries may have been the
different public health practises and public expectations concerning school closures and influenza in the selected
countries.Background
The use of school closures during influenza epidemics
and pandemics as a non-pharmaceutical intervention
(NPI) is a topic that has received considerable attention
from policy makers, the public health research commu-
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article, unless otherwise stated.during the 2009 H1N1 influenza (A(H1N1)pdm09) pan-
demic [1]. School closure was also extensively consid-
ered in national pandemic plans developed prior to the
start of the pandemic [2-6] and during previous pan-
demics of the 20th century [7-11].
Prior to the 2009 pandemic, a multidisciplinary per-
spective was used at a workshop organised under the
European Union French Presidency (2008) to review the
various aspects of school closures as a public health
measure [12]. That review noted how the severity and
impact of each pandemic is different and that the impact
and relevance of school closure would, to a large extent,ntral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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tics of the pandemic strain, and the severity of disease
[12]. For example, school closure may have had a more
substantial effect during the 1957 pandemic, when much
of the transmission occurred among children, than it
would have had in 1918 when young adults were also af-
fected, or in 1968 when illness attack rates were similar
among children and adults [12].
The review also highlighted that the generic expression
“school closure” reflects very different strategies. School
closure could be reactive (i.e. when children or staff of the
school start experiencing illness) or proactive (i.e. before
substantial transmission in the school); the duration could
vary from a few days to a few months; and include all chil-
dren and staff (“school closure”) or specific classes with the
remainder of the school remaining open (“class dismissal”).
At the time, the review concluded that health benefits
could be expected (in particular a reduction of healthcare
service demand at the peak of the outbreak) to an extent
that would depend on the epidemiological characteristics
of the virus and the way the policy would be implemented.
Equally though, it was recognised that school closure is as-
sociated with high economic, social and educational costs
and could potentially disrupt healthcare provision via in-
creased absenteeism of clinical staff attending to their chil-
dren [12]. Since then, analyses of additional data collected
during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic have made it pos-
sible to further quantify the impact of closures so that lit-
erature assessing impact is now substantial [7-11,13-25].
Although essential, assessment of impact is only one
of the elements that inform school closure policies. In-
deed, national policy makers are constrained by the
structure of their political and school systems as well as
the local perspective/culture on health issues. Paradoxic-
ally, those factors as well as many simple yet essential
questions on school closure during the A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic remain poorly documented. Were schools
closed during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic around the
world? If so, how and to what extent? What were the de-
cision processes and how was the intervention per-
ceived? What were the operational issues associated with
school closure? Why is it that certain countries imple-
mented large scale closure policies while others did
not recommend the use of school closure as a mitigation
policy? To address these questions, we first position
school closures in the context of the A(H1N1)pdm09 pan-
demic. We then retrospectively review and compare
national and local experiences with school closures in sev-
eral countries during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. Fi-
nally, we discuss lessons learnt.
Methods
Here we review the experiences of school closures during
the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic and for seasonal influenzafor eleven countries and one administrative region that
had prepared pandemic plans at a national or local level.
The data used in this review were obtained during and fol-
lowing a meeting, organized by the European Centres for
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), on school clo-
sures held in October 2010 in Stockholm, Sweden. At the
meeting, local and national experiences were presented
from six countries and one administrative region by coun-
try representatives from local and national institutions
involved in or providing input into school closure pol-
icies: Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Hong
Kong SAR (HK), Italy, Japan and the United States
(US; national and New York City). Following the meeting,
SC, MVK and AN contacted country representatives
of five additional countries (China, New Zealand, Serbia,
South Africa and Thailand) to contribute data and infor-
mation on their country’s experiences of school closure.
All the country representatives are listed in the author list
of the paper.
Our intention was not to make a systematic review of
all national and local experiences. Rather, it was to de-
scribe the diversity of school closure experiences and
provide examples from national and local perspectives.
As a consequence, the participating countries and ad-
ministrative regions (Bulgaria, China, France, HK, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, UK,
US) included in this review were known to represent a
range of responses but are not a representative sample
of countries around the world. The decision to invite
countries to the initial ECDC meeting in Stockholm was
made on the same basis.
A standard data collection form was used for data col-
lection and sent to study participants (see Additional
file 1). The data collection form contained questions
about school closure during seasonal influenza epidemics
and in pre-pandemic plans, recommendations, decision
making and extent of school closure during the A(H1N1)
pdm09 pandemic. Data were summarized in tables and
figures. For each location, the number of schools affected
by closures per million inhabitants was computed. There
was no need to consult an ethics committee as no data on
individuals were collected.
Results
The epidemiology of the pandemic and use of school
closures
Early in the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, it was clear from
early data from the US, Mexico and the UK that trans-
mission was heavily focused in children [26-29], which
was later confirmed from epidemiologic data from other
countries as they became affected. Initial media reports
from Mexico in early April 2009 caused concerns about
the severity of the emerging pandemic. While the sever-
ity of the pandemic was difficult to assess early on, a
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reported during the 1918 pandemic) was quickly ex-
cluded [27,30]. More precise assessment of severity was
harder to make and it was appreciated that severity was
indeed a complicated concept.
Those epidemiological characteristics of relatively low
(yet uncertain) severity and high transmission (especially
in children) meant that the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic
fell within the ambiguous or “grey” zone for scientific ad-
visers and decision makers (Figure 1). While closing
schools during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic was ex-
pected to have an impact on transmission because of the
age-specific immunity profile, it was unclear whether the
potential benefits were worth the high economic and so-
cial costs. The absence of clear answers to this and other
questions, the complexity of decision making and school
systems left fertile ground for divergent views and inter-
pretations on the relevance of school closures in the 2009
context. This was partly reflected by the heterogeneity in
the policy options taken by the different countries.
School closures during seasonal influenza outbreaks and
other public health crises
Closing schools during seasonal influenza epidemics is a
standard policy in two of the 12 countries and adminis-
trative region that participated in this review (Japan and
Bulgaria). Japan implements a policy of closure of classes,Figure 1 Epidemiological characteristics and relevance of school closugrades and schools (C-CGS) during seasonal influenza
epidemics. This is a gradualist policy. For example, Japan
will close a class if a certain percentage (usually 10-20%)
of students are absent; close a grade if ≥ 2 classes in the
grade meet the above criterion; and close a school if ≥ 2
grades of the school meet the same criterion. The exact
criteria for closures are usually defined by the local board
of education; but a final decision is made by each school.
In Japan, there is no nationwide recommendation apart
from the notification to schools from the Ministry of
Education (Item No. 1125) about the prevention of influenza-
like illness (ILI) that dates back to 1982 and indicates that
“class closure should be considered when the rate of
student absenteeism due to infection reaches approxi-
mately 15-20%”. This notification from 1982 shows
the long history of the C-CGS policy in the country and
references to the policy can be found in reports dating
back to the 1957 pandemic. Figure 2 shows the extent
to which the C-CGS policy was implemented during
seasonal influenza epidemics between 1997 and 2008.
In that period, on average, 8,746 classes were closed
each year. 3,166 and 594 classes affected by grade
and school closures, respectively. The average propor-
tion of classes affected by full school closures was
low (5%).
Bulgaria also has a long history of closing schools dur-
ing seasonal influenza epidemics. Such policies were firstres.
Figure 2 Number of classes that were affected by school, grade
or class closures in Japan during seasonal influenza epidemics
between 1997 and 2008. (Source: http://idsc.nih.go.jp/idwr/
kanja/infreport/report.html).
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children are absent because of illness, a temporary
school closure of individual schools or of all schools in
the region may be considered by regional authorities. Al-
though the recommended threshold of 30% absenteeism
rate to trigger closure is high, in practice, many schools
close each year during the annual seasonal influenza
epidemics.
The other countries and administrative regions partici-
pating in this review do not routinely close schools dur-
ing seasonal influenza epidemics. Some of these have
relatively different uses of school closures to deal with
public health crises. Notably HK has a considerable ex-
perience of closing schools during infectious disease out-
breaks. For example, authorities in HK closed all schools
during the SARS outbreak in 2003 [25] and all primary
schools and kindergartens during a seasonal influenza
outbreak in 2008 following two influenza-related deaths
in children [20]. The NPI is usually accepted locally and
indeed expected by the population including by politi-
cians in HK. In other countries, it may be recognized
that individual schools may choose to close temporarily
for operational reasons (that is, if they have substantial
student or staff absenteeism); but school closure seems
to be used only rarely to manage infectious disease out-
breaks [31]. In other countries, pre-scheduled school
closures may coincide with the local seasonal influenza
epidemics, which may have an unintentional impact on
virus transmission. For example, South African schools
were closed for the duration of the 2010 FIFA World
Cup (a period of one month), which coincided with the
seasonal influenza epidemic that year.
School closures in national pandemic preparedness plans
All twelve countries and administrative regions discuss
school closure as a mitigation measure during influ-
enza pandemics; however, only three (Japan, Bulgaria andThailand) indicate that they would certainly close schools
during an influenza pandemic (Table 1). The other nine
countries and administrative regions left the option open,
stating it would depend on circumstances.
National recommendations and local decisions during the
A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic
During the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, the decision to
close schools was a process that involved both national
and local policy makers and school administrators. All
countries and administrative regions made recommenda-
tions on school closure at the national level. There was
often a lead agency/Ministry, which consulted with other
agencies/Ministries to prepare recommendations.
In addition to recommendations made at the national
level, recommendations were sometimes also made at
a more regional (sub-national) level. This was, for ex-
ample, the case in the US, South Africa and Bulgaria,
where health is designated responsibility of the states/
provinces.
For reactive closures, although recommendations were
essentially made at the national level, decision making
on school closure was always undertaken at the local
level. In the UK and Thailand, closure was decided at
the school level (by school principals, headmasters or
school boards). In China, France and South Africa, the
decision was made by local governments or local repre-
sentatives of the state.
In some regions, decisions were made at different
levels depending on the type of school or the pandemic
phase. For example, in the US, different States and cities
had different school closure policies, and the decision as
to whether to close schools or not were being made lo-
cally. In New York City, the NYC Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene made the decision for public schools
in consultation with the Department of Education; but
private schools made their decisions independently. In
Japan, New Zealand and Thailand, regional policy makers
were in charge of making the decision during the ini-
tial phase; but later on, closure was the responsibility
of school officials.
Recommendations on school closure during the A(H1N1)
pdm09 pandemic
During the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, all countries and
administrative regions included in this review acknowl-
edged that some schools might have to close (or some clas-
ses to be dismissed) when high absenteeism of students/
staff meant that the school could no longer function
normally. All also implemented measures to reinforce in-
fection control in schools (e.g., communication on hand
hygiene, sick students/staff advised to stay home, etc). But
the use of school closures to mitigate the pandemic varied
substantially between locations.
Table 1 Summary table
Bulgaria China England France Hong Kong Italy Japan New York New Zealand Serbia South Africa Thailand USA
Planning
Were school
closures discussed
in pre-pandemic
plans prior to
A(H1N1)pdm09?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shall school closures
be used according
to pre-pandemic
plans?
Yes Maybe Maybe Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes Maybe Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes Maybe
Recommendations MoH for national
closures. Local
health authorities
for local closures.
MoH and MoE Advice given by
Scientific Advisory
Committee for
Emergencies and
Government
Departments
(Health, Children)
MoE led, with
MoH and of
Interior
MoH MoH and
MoE
MoE led,
with MoH
NYC health
authorities
MoH MoH MoE led,
with MoH
MoH CDC (in
consultation
with MoE
and other
partners)
Who made the
recommendations
about school
closures during
A(H1N1)pdm09?
Decision making
Who made the
decision to close
schools during
A(H1N1)pdm09?
MoE for national
closures. Local
Education boards
for local closures
Local
government
(MoH and MoE)
School headmaster
in consultation with
local public health
officials
Local
representative
of State
Chief
executive
(equivalent
of prime
minister)
Local
health
authorities
in
agreement
with the
headmaster
Local
authorities
during
initial
phase.
School
principal
later on
NYC health
authorities in
consultation
with DoE for
public schools;
private schools
made their
own decision.
Local health
authorities
during
containment
period. School
boards during
mitigation
period
MoE Local
government
(local MoH
and MoE)
School
principal
Local/State
Health
Departments
in
collaboration
with local
school
authorities
Type of closure
School closure is
standard policy
during seasonal
epidemics?
Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No No
Were schools closed
pro-actively during
A(H1N1)pdm09?
Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No
Was there a policy
of closing schools
reactively?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Only from
April 28th
2009 to May
5th 2009
MoE: Ministry of Education or equivalent; MoH: Ministry of Health or equivalent; DoE: Department of Education.
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early in the pandemic
Three countries (UK, US and South Africa) quickly de-
cided not to recommend school closure to mitigate the
pandemic at the national level. In the US, CDC advised
on 28 April 2009 that dismissal of students for at least
seven days should be strongly considered in schools with
a confirmed or a suspected case epidemiologically linked
to a confirmed case. However, the guidance was modified
on 1 May 2009 recommending 14-day dismissals, but that
modification was in effect for only four days which in-
cluded a weekend. From 5 May 2009 onward, school
dismissal was no longer recommended as a community
mitigation measure in the US. In South Africa, a recom-
mendation was made early during the onset of the local
epidemic caused by A(H1N1)pdm09 (June 2009) not to
use school closure as a mitigation strategy. In these three
countries, the argument for not closing schools was that
the pandemic was judged not to be severe and the poten-
tial benefits of school closure did not outweigh the dele-
terious socioeconomic impact that such an intervention
would have.
In the European Union, in August 2009, a policy commit-
tee of Member States, chaired by the European Commission
and advised by ECDC, issued a recommendation noting
no reason to close schools proactively in Europe [32].
Reactive closures
All the other countries and administrative regions in-
cluded in this analysis made recommendations for react-
ive school closure. The recommended strategies were
usually proportionate, with, for example, closure of a class
if more than a certain number of children were absent in
the class and closure of the school if more than a certain
number of classes were affected. Schools were usually
recommended to close for at least seven days. As ex-
plained above, final decisions were often left to local or
school authorities.
Pro-active closures
HK, Japan, Bulgaria and Serbia implemented pro-active
school closures. HK and Japan did so early on in their
spring 2009 wave, while Bulgaria and Serbia used it to
mitigate their 2009 autumn waves.
In the early phase of the pandemic, HK implemented
aggressive strategies to attempt to contain and later on
to mitigate the spread the virus. Once the first case due to
indigenous transmission was confirmed on 10 June 2009,
they moved from a “containment phase” to a “mitigation
phase” designed to relieve disease burden and mortality,
primarily based on NPI [15,17]. The mitigation phase in-
cluded: public health campaigns (improved hygiene, etc.),
medical resource mobilization, opening of eight desig-
nated fever clinics (13 June 2009), and antiviral treatmentof confirmed cases. In addition, there was an immedi-
ate proactive closure of kindergarten/primary schools
(children up to 12) for at least 2 weeks (starting 12 June
2009) along with reactive closure of secondary schools with
more than one confirmed case.
Osaka and Hyogo, two prefectures in Japan, imple-
mented proactive school closures between 18-24 May
2009. In Osaka prefecture, at least 796 schools (270 high
schools and 526 junior high schools) closed during that
time period [33]; primary schools and kindergartens were
also closed in some cities. In Hyogo prefecture, a total of
2,352 schools, kindergartens and universities closed dur-
ing this time period. Pro-active closures also took place in
whole/part of municipalities and school district between
18 May and 18 July 2009.
In Bulgaria, on 6 November 2009, the Ministry of Health
declared a nationwide influenza epidemic and recom-
mended to the Ministry of Education to close all schools
in the country for five working days. Decisions on whether
to close nurseries, child day care centers and the suspen-
sion of sessions at universities were delegated to the re-
gional level.
In Serbia, a short 6-days school holiday (Thursday to
Tuesday) was extended by 3 days nationwide during the
first peak of the autumn pandemic wave in November
2009. In December, Christmas holidays were brought for-
ward a week to mitigate a second peak.
Extent of school closure
For countries and administrative regions that provided
information, Figure 3 shows the total number of schools
and number of schools per 1 million inhabitants, which
were affected by school, grade or class closures. Relative
to population size, Serbia and HK, which closed all the
schools, were by far the areas which implemented a
school closure policy most widely. 160,742 closures were
reported in Japan (1,258 reported closures per million
inhabitants). No school closure count was available
for Bulgaria, the last country that closed schools pro-
actively. However, multiple reporting from the same
school was frequent so that the Japanese figure is an
over estimate (there are about 60,000 schools in Japan).
Even so, it indicates that closures were on a massive scale
in Japan.
It is interesting to note that although France, Thailand,
China and Italy made relatively similar recommenda-
tions of closing schools reactively, the extent to which
the policy was implemented locally varied markedly. For
example from 0.13 (Italy) to 16 (France) schools affected
per 1 million inhabitants though for those two countries
there was no strong evidence of differences in impact of
the pandemic [34]. For countries and administrative re-
gions that provided information, the effective duration
of closure was often shorter than the duration of seven
AB
Figure 3 Extent of school, grade and class closures in participating countries. A: total number of schools affected by closures* during the
2009 H1N1pdm09 influenza pandemic; B: number of schools affected by closures during the 2009 H1N1pdm09 influenza pandemic per 1 million
inhabitants. ( *: e.g., may include complete school closure, grade closure and/or class closure).
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cations (Figure 4).
Discussion
This review highlights the very diverse national and local
experiences on school closures during the A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic in eleven countries and one administrative region.Figure 4 Effective duration of closure (square: average; vertical line: r
number of schools affected by closures.It also showed the many challenges associated with the
implementation of this intervention.
Different school closure policies and expectations
First, there were important differences in the manage-
ment of school closures across the participating coun-
tries. The processes (e.g., who was in charge of makingange) in participating countries. Countries are sorted by decreasing
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cision to close, etc) varied between countries. There were
also marked differences in the school closure strategies
with three countries and the European Union recommend-
ing to not use school closure as a mitigation strategy from
relatively early on, while some countries recommended
some sort of reactive closure, and still others implemented
proactive closures at a large scale. Even among countries
that made similar recommendations (e.g., allowing reactive
closures) the actual extent of closure that took place varied
substantially.
In the original plans of this research, we aimed to report
on the reasoning behind each national policy decision to
try to better understand why outcomes were so diverse.
However, we quickly realized that this would be difficult to
document in an objective way and that besides the out-
come might actually provide limited insight. Indeed, the ar-
guments in favor or against closure are already quite well
known: it is a matter of finding the right balance between
mitigating and delaying spread versus paying the poten-
tially high cost associated with closure. Therefore, the
question is not so much about the arguments used by
countries to justify their decisions but more about why
they made different appreciations of the health benefits
and the economic and social costs of the intervention. In
the end, we believe that the single most important factor
to explain these differences was the very different public
health practises and public expectations concerning school
closures and influenza in the countries selected. For ex-
ample, Japan and Bulgaria consider school closure as rou-
tine during seasonal influenza epidemics; and in HK,
closures are expected from the population and politicians
during large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. By contrast,
it may require a severe pandemic for the intervention to be
considered as a policy option, for example, in the UK.
Obviously, these different interpretations were made pos-
sible because of the absence of a clear cut scientific/public
health answer on the anticipated impact of school closures
in a pandemic of moderate severity such as the A(H1N1)
pdm09 pandemic, illustrated by the “grey zone” in Figure 1.
Though closing schools was expected to have a significant
impact on transmission dynamics in 2009 because of the
age-specific transmission profile of the pandemic virus, one
must ask if the benefits outweigh the high economic and
social costs of closure, especially given that disease severity
was relatively limited. This left considerable room for differ-
ent views on the effectiveness to be transformed into policy.
A last factor was the complexity of school systems and
hence decision making with co-existing state and religious
systems plus private schools in a number of countries.
Monitoring and local decision making
Implementing reactive closures of schools on a relatively
large scale requires that surveillance systems are in placein schools to monitor illness and absenteeism rates. In
NYC, for example, the decision to close schools was based
on trends in influenza like illness (ILI) visits to school
nurses (sustained or sudden increase) and absenteeism.
School health nurses who were in charge of gathering the
data for their school were often overwhelmed so that the
school data was generally not available for review until late
afternoon and the decisions on closure could not take
place until the evening - too late to inform parents.
Since school closures to mitigate influenza epidemics
have been standard policy in Japan for many years, the
country has developed an efficient system to monitor ab-
senteeism in schools, and make decisions on closure on
the basis of that system. The information about each
school passed to relevant education boards (municipal
board for most elementary and junior high schools and
prefectural board for most high schools), and directly to
the Ministry of Education for most private schools. The
information is analyzed at the Ministry of Education and
shared with the Ministry of Health. This process is per-
formed on a daily basis. In contrast, pro-active closures
as implemented in Osaka and Hyogo prefectures in
Japan or in HK were simply triggered by the first local
pandemic cases that were not linked to importation.
Communication challenges
School closure was associated with a range of communi-
cation challenges.
With parents and school staff
Good communication with parents and school staff is an
important part of the control strategy and may require
substantial effort. For example, in New York City, some of
the communication challenges with parents and school
staff included:
 Translating: By local regulations, all parental
communications had to be translated into nine
languages.
 Notifying closures: In the spring 2009 wave, since
decisions of closures had to be made after the end of
the school day, notifications of closure had to be
made via media and word of mouth. Representatives
of the Department of Health and of the Department
of Education were also present in the morning of
closure at school to notify or discuss with parents.
 Making parents part of the strategy: In the
autumn 2009 wave, the Department of Education
did not plan to close schools with influenza activity
but rather emphasized teaching students preventive
measures (e.g., wash/sanitize hands often, avoid
touching mouth and nose etc) and parents were
instructed to keep children home if they had ILI.
Communication with families and principals was
Table 2 Recommended areas for further work on school
closures by authorities
Area Description
Pandemic
planning
Ensure that school closures (as a public health
intervention or due to large absenteeism in
schools) is included in generic pandemic planning.
Triggers Agree on triggers for proactive and reactive
closures in a pandemic and how they would be
operated at the local level.
National decision
making
Prepare arrangements for national decision-making
on school closures and how adjoining counties
would apply these.
Mitigating adverse
effects
Develop arrangements for mitigating the adverse
impact of school closures notably for alternative
care arrangements and continuing education.
Special schools Consider how special schools would be included
in these arrangements.
Communication Develop communication plans and materials for
school staff, parents and the media.
Local planning Ensure there are robust local plans for closures
across complex school systems and exercise these
plans on occasions for pandemic and other
emergencies (such as extreme weather).
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were sent home to families with the children
during the first week of school and throughout
the influenza season; information materials were
provided to schools; outreach was implemented to
community education councils and parent groups;
weekly influenza updates were sent to all school
principals and there was also ongoing
communication with school nurses. At the end of
each school day, the Department of Education
reported online attendance rates and instances of
ILI in public schools. If a school reported five
cases of ILI among students in attendance,
parents were sent a second letter on keeping ill
children at home and the school reinforced
messages on hand washing and covering coughs.
 Dealing with staff concerns: To address the
concerns of school staff about their safety, the
city developed an Influenza Health and Safety
Program.
National to local communications & communications
between agencies
Managing the pandemic and school closures often required
very close interactions between the different agencies and
the different levels of policy making.
Early in the pandemic, in the US, CDC had daily con-
ference calls with Public Health State officials where the
management of the pandemic, including school closure
policies, was discussed. Those conference calls were critical
for sharing data, discussing policy questions and recom-
mendations. The prompt change of CDC recommenda-
tions on school closure (between 28 April and 5 May
2009) although primarily based on the accumulated epi-
demiologic data from the US outbreaks was also cor-
roborated by the feedback that CDC received during
those conference calls, where some state officials regarded
the guidance as overly disruptive for the locally per-
ceived level of severity. Similar close communication be-
tween agencies was also reported in a number of the other
countries.
There were sometimes differences in the perception of
risk between the national level (at which most of recom-
mendations were made) and the local level (where deci-
sion making took place). For example, in France, it was
reported that the perception of risk was higher at the na-
tional level where potential deaths among children was
seen as an incentive to act preventively and in a context
where public health issues are interpreted in terms of
political responsibilities by major ministries. Also there
had been considerable planning on how to educate and
manage children if the schools had to close. But local
authorities were reluctant to close schools due to a com-
bination of lower risk perception and a general pattern oflocal public policy-making where the primary objective is
to maintain normal life, unless an immediate and major
risk is identified. There were also doubts at the local level
about the overall strategy given its sophistication. Parents
who had a low perception of the risk considered the inter-
vention as a constraint. Nevertheless there were significant
numbers of school closures in France.
Communicating in a context of uncertainty
The pandemic also highlighted the difficulty in commu-
nicating in a context of uncertainty and where risk as-
sessment may quickly change. For example, in many
countries, there was sporadic media criticism of rapidly
changing guidance, and differences in practice between
localities and over time in spite of explicit statements in
the initial guidance that changes in guidance would be
forthcoming pending more data.
Authority to close schools
One of the challenges faced when managing school clo-
sures was that different schools systems (e.g., public, pri-
vate and parochial) often coexist. For example in NYC the
public (state) system is centrally operated and closures in
that system were decided by the Chancellor or the like;
but that is not the case of the private and parochial
systems for which closures were done at the discretion of
the school.
In many countries, the national government could impose
nationwide closures. But this is not necessarily straightfor-
ward. For example, in semi-autonomous or federal coun-
tries like South Africa or the USA, each state/province
Cauchemez et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:207 Page 10 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/207has the authority to make their own decision even if this
means a seeming inconsistency across the country.
Limitations
The countries and administrative regions participating in
this review are not a representative sample of countries
around the world. Indeed, our intention was not to make
a systematic review but to describe the diversity of
school closure experiences and provide examples from
national and local perspectives. Therefore it is not pos-
sible to generalize on the extent of school closure
around the world from this work.
In this review, we described national and local experi-
ences on school closure. We presented the various pol-
icy processes leading to closure (from the elaboration of
recommendations to the implementation of the policy)
as well as the extent of closure (e.g., how many schools
closed and for how long). We also discussed policy chal-
lenges associated with the intervention. However, im-
portant areas of research on school closures, such as the
impact on spread and health care provision as well as the
economical and social cost of closing schools, were left
out of the review. A review of those aspects of school clos-
ure can be found in [12].
Conclusions
Even in the relatively mild severity scenario of the A
(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic [35], the findings of this work
indicate that there was a range of responses and applica-
tions of the school closures policies. The processes in-
cluding who was in charge of making recommendations
and who was in charge of making the decision to close,
the school-based control strategies, the extent of school
closures, the public health tradition of responses and
expectations on school closure varied greatly between
countries.
Consistent to the experience from earlier influenza
pandemics [7-11], the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic con-
firmed the impact that some forms of school closing
could have on the community-wide influenza transmis-
sion dynamics [13-17]. Given that epidemiologic evi-
dence and looking very practically at pressures exerted
on policy makers during an emerging pandemic, it is
reasonable to predict that the school closure policy will
be considered and implemented in future pandemics, at
an extent that will depend on the perceived severity and
perceived impact of the pandemic virus on children’s
health. There is, therefore, good reason for countries to
persist with working on the school closure policies and
assessing their effect on transmission and overall societal
impact. This review has demonstrated that much work
remains to ensure smooth implementation of the school
closure policy, a feasible NPI that may be used during
future influenza pandemics (Table 2).Additional file
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